Original title: Equilibrium Transition and Cartel Formation: A Structural Analysis of Chile's Pharmacy Cartel
Yu, Hao · September 2026
Big pharmacy chains were stuck in an aggressive price warA cycle of repeated price cuts by competitors trying not to lose customers., cutting prices on popular items to lure shoppers. Researchers wanted to know how these rivals managed to stop fighting and form an illegal cartel to raise prices together. Using court-record daily prices and an economic model, the researchers tracked what happened. First, a court banned comparative ads. This sharply cut the profits chains made from deeply discounted items, weakening their desire to fight. Next, the chains used an upstream supplier as a middleman to test a follow-the-leader pricing scheme. Once proven, they used it to restore their profit margins and then pushed prices even higher to extract extra profits, though those later increases spread more slowly.
Imagine two food stalls keep undercutting each other until neither makes money. Then the city bans their street signs, so the cheap specials no longer pull in crowds. With the main reason for cutting prices gone, one stall owner quietly signals a higher price and checks through a shared supplier that the other followed. In this paper, the pharmacy chains' costly cycle of cuts stopped paying off after an ad ban, so they used an upstream supplier to verify a plan to follow one chain's lead and then raised prices.
Cartels raise prices for ordinary shoppers. This case shows how a price war can end and coordination begin, and how a supplier can be used to make sure no one cheats. Understanding that mechanism helps regulators spot the same pattern elsewhere.
The abstract doesn't say what the limitations are. It does not quantify total consumer harm, estimate overcharges, identify which chain acted as price leader, or say whether the collusion continued after the study period.
Ask anything about this paper. Answers come from its abstract, and say so when the abstract doesn't cover your question.
Equilibrium Transition and Cartel Formation: A Structural Analysis of Chile's Pharmacy Cartel — Yu, Hao
Abstract licence: CC0
Explanation generated by Synthesis from the abstract — it is not the original paper. This is a preprint, so it hasn't necessarily been peer reviewed.